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Abstract— Leading-edge integrated circuits can cost more than their weight in gold and often 
control electronic systems of far greater value. However, few mechanisms are currently 
available to protect investments made by individuals, commercial entities and institutions in 
electronic products and related intellectual property (IP). Hardware piracy has reached an 
unprecedented scale and fuels serious threats of subversion by malicious insertions (Trojans). 
These threats have been articulated by business and military strategists, and confirmed by 
forensic security experts analyzing recent incidents. In particular, software and network systems 
running on subverted chips are vulnerable to concerted, remotely-activated, untraceable break-
ins. Responding to these challenges in a scalable and cost-effective way requires chips and 
entire systems that protect themselves from a wide range of attacks, as well as new EDA tools 
and methodologies for design, verification and test of such chips. These tools integrate recently 
developed techniques for hardware security and novel design primitives into conventional EDA 
flows, while preventing or detecting side channels, backdoors, and malicious alterations in 
functionality. In this article we outline key challenges, introduce recent ideas and ongoing efforts, 
formulate an agenda for research in IC security, and suggest how EDA techniques can be 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
While preparing this article, we found dozens of recent media reports on cybersecurity issues, 
such as the breaking of encryption used in the Sony PlayStation 3, successful attacks on the Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) used in modern PCs and on widely-used RSA chips, as well as the 
circumvention of application locks on Apple iPhones. The FBI has arrested electronics brokers who 
sold $3.5M worth of fake network equipment to the U.S. government, and U.S. Air Force wings have 
been tasked with “information operations” and “network warfare”.  
 From the business perspective, a major concern is the rise of fake or mislabeled hardware, 
and microelectronics IP theft. Revenue lost to IP infringement reaches into the billions of dollars, but 
the value of systems that can be compromised by subsequent breaches in chip/networking security is 
much larger. For example, hardware-based security is a necessary element of fledgling automotive 
electronics, especially systems for remote tracking, activation and lock-up such as LoJack and OnStar. 
Hardware vulnerabilities could open the doors to higher-level attacks on software, content and 
networks. Modern distributed power grids, controlled through computer networks, are often cited as a 
critical infrastructure vulnerable to remote exploits. To this end, a spectrum of hardware-based 
security methods has recently been developed, but not adopted widely enough to make an impact. 
Cybersecurity challenges have become significant enough to merit responses by major 
corporations whose products have been pirated, and by oil conglomerates suffering from network 
espionage. Government officials, including the U.S. Secretary of State, have been involved in related 
international disputes and treaty negotiations. In 2005, the Defense Science Board pointed out the 
perils of a contaminated chip supply [5] and articulated the growing significance of hardware security 
in the next decade. Motivated by these trends, in this article we review specific threats to chip supply, 
outline a research agenda in hardware security, introduce recent ideas and ongoing efforts, and 
suggest research and business opportunities.  
 
Glossary of Terms 
Malicious insertions: 
Trojans and backdoors 
Added components or features hidden in the IC. 
Backdoors enable remote control of the IC. Trojans 
implement secret, initially-dormant features. 
Side channel  Unintended information channel (usually based on 
physical observations) exposing IC’s internal states 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)  A secure crypto-processor (spec or implementation) 
with storage for crypto keys to protect data 
Counterfeit (fake) ICs  ICs that are copied, designed, or labeled to mimic 
another IC, but produced at a smaller cost and/or 
without authorization. 
IC metering: passive and active  Ways to ascertain ownership of design IP, and keep 
track of manufactured and/or deployed ICs. Passive 
metering (e.g., watermarking) employs read-only 
analysis of individual chips. Active metering locks the 
functionality of the IC so as to require chip activation. 
IP watermark  A unique mark (signature) for the IP (design) 
Unique chip ID (IC fingerprint)  A unique mark (signature) for the IC (chip) 
Physical unclonable function 
(PUF) 
A unique mapping between the IC’s input and output 
(often depends on unclonable parameter variations) 
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II. CONTAMINATED CHIPS 
Challenges in IC security involve threats directed at chips themselves, design data, embedded 
systems, and even the software that runs on these chips. Unlike purely software-based exploits, IC 
subversion has a higher barrier to entry in terms of cost, required design expertise and distribution 
channels. Therefore, infrastructure and cost considerations play a significant role in our discussion. 
Problem 1. Counterfeit or malicious chips can be designed, manufactured or marketed by 
stand-alone entities, such as the fake NEC Corp. that was dismantled in China several years ago after 
the real NEC Corp. received unexpected customer-support requests [4]. However, infiltrating a typical 
IC design and fabrication flow (shown in Figure 1) requires a much smaller capital investment and 
entails smaller risks. The flow often starts from the functional specification and goes through the   
stages of design, fabrication, testing, packaging and integration in consumer electronics. Multiple 
entities are involved in this flow. For example, design houses often send their chips to offshore 
facilities for fabrication. The red exclamation marks in Figure 1 indicate potential vulnerabilities, 
including transfers of design data and specific steps of the flow. Vulnerabilities may be introduced by 
(a) unauthorized remote access to design data, (b) disgruntled, malicious or intimidated IC engineers, 
(c) physical access to design offices, and even (d) corrupted software tools [15]. 
Problem 2. IC Trojan horses, side channels 
and backdoors. Perhaps the most obvious threat 
vector is third-party Intellectual Property (IP) 
included during the design stage. While such IP 
blocks can be specified at different levels of 
abstraction, they may contain dormant malicious 
features that can be activated remotely – a basic 
example of an IC Trojan horse [1][5][16]. Third-
party IP blocks may implement side channels and 
hidden monitors that can be activated by 
statistically-improbable secret commands. Such an 
unauthorized control mechanism is termed a 
backdoor or a hardware Trojan [17][9]. Once 
backdoors are embedded into a sufficient number 
of units, or into mission-critical units, hidden 
features can be activated in concert, leading to 
denial of service,  disclosure of confidential 
information, and other adversarial benefits. 
Identifying the perpetrators can be difficult – a 
backdoor can be secretly embedded into otherwise 
legitimate electronic systems, or designed as a 
feature, but then used by someone else. The latter 
scenario is exemplified by the well-publicized case 
in which cellular phones of 100 top Greek officials 
were bugged for two years (2004-2005) [11]. 
Replacing compromised ICs can be costly, and 
their interactions with software are difficult to study. 
Problem 3. Need for IC metering. Fabless IP 
providers, on the other hand, must meter the use of 
IP blocks sold, so as to protect their revenue 
stream. Indeed, once an authorized batch of ICs is 
produced, the incremental cost of doubling production is small. Such excess production, sometimes DAC.COM KNOWLEDGE CENTER ARTICLE 
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caused by mistake, gives rise to pirated chips which can be indistinguishable from authorized chips, 
but sold at half-price, undermining the market for legitimate chips. A spectrum of watermarking 
techniques at different levels of abstraction has been developed for uniquely identifying the IP [7][12]. 
In addition to unique identification of design IP by watermarking, techniques for unique IC 
identification, known as IC metering, have been known and used for 30-40 years, usually in the form 
of passive IC metering by fingerprinting the IC. Techniques developed recently offer stronger 
enforcement by requiring every chip to be activated with a unique code (active IC metering) [2][14]. 
Without such protections, perpetrators can introduce small, subversive changes into unauthorized 
chips that are undetectable by conventional testing procedures [1][5][10][16]. Such design Trojans 
jeopardize the functionality of an IC, its network communications, as well as its vendor’s reputation. 
While visual inspection of chip internals has been effective until recently, further miniaturization of 
process technology to deep-subwavelength feature sizes makes this increasingly difficult. 
Problem 4. Protecting lightweight applications, such as smartcards and RFIDs [8]. Due to 
their physical availability to attackers and limited complexity, such devices can be reverse-engineered, 
with the purpose of altering their intended behavior. Attackers may refill electronic-cash systems with 
“free money”, fake electronic passports, or fool a supermarket checkout system into scanning a new 
television set as a toothbrush. In such embedded systems, the considerations of power, size and cost 
limit the inclusion of reliable security cores [13]. While generally more secure, larger embedded 
systems may be vulnerable to component replacement and the IC threats discussed earlier.  
 
III. AGENDA FOR RESEARCH IN HARDWARE SECURITY 
 
Until recently, efforts in electronic system security have mostly focused on network and operating-
systems aspects, as well as biometrics – but have paid less attention to unauthorized physical access 
and malicious changes in IC designs. However, recent fast-paced developments in cybersecurity, as 
well as their monetary impact, suggest that broader IC-centric research efforts are necessary. Several 
ongoing initiatives pursue contest-like settings where teams of researchers act as attackers and 
defenders, so as to explore leading-edge techniques for IC subversion, along with protection 
mechanisms. DARPA is running one such program, called TRUST, with industrial participants. 
Polytechnic University in Brooklyn has been organizing annual student competitions along these lines 
for the last several years. Key challenges in hardware security involve high-level chip defenses 
(activation and locking protocols, multichip systems, interactions with software) and necessary IC 
infrastructure (unique chip IDs, verification and test, physical integrity, and suppression of side 
channels). 
Challenge 1. Effective measures to prevent IC cloning through unauthorized manufacturing can 
significantly boost the marketplace. Other forms of design IP (e.g., soft and hard cores) also lack 
established protection mechanisms. Despite the breadth of business contexts and technical 
circumstances, the adoption of such measures is typically obstructed by their overhead in cost, power, 
and performance. While preventive measures such as fingerprinting or watermarking could be useful 
in court cases [7][12], they are not cost-effective for detection of potential abuse. By contrast, active 
metering of ICs/IPs monitors and queries the devices during activation or normal use [2][14]. 
Challenge 2. To differentiate individual ICs and prevent digital cloning, researchers have 
proposed the idea of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and other forms of unclonable 
identification. A PUF is a function embodied in the physical structure of the device that is easy to 
evaluate but hard to capture in its entirety within typical time/memory constraints [10] [3][16][20]. Such 
unclonable identifiers are especially important for Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), where 
secure non-volatile memory for key storage is not readily available [18]. The current challenges and DAC.COM KNOWLEDGE CENTER ARTICLE 
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active research topics in this area include the development of methods for ensuring PUF stability 
under different ambient conditions, and ensuring PUF robustness to sophisticated attacks.  
Challenge 3. Verification of third-party design IP, and test of off-the-shelf IC components for 
security and integrity, are essential to effective countermeasures against many types of attacks 
[15][17]. However, easy silver bullets are unlikely, as these techniques may have to subsume 
traditional design verification and circuit test. Rather than detecting and localizing accidental bugs 
during a prolonged effort, it is becoming necessary to identify intentionally-placed backdoors and side-
channels through quick inspection. Such techniques must span all levels of abstraction employed in 
IC design: from logic-level search for sequentially-deep states (a hallmark of a backdoor) and Boolean 
outputs that do not match the prototype (likely side-channel), to unexpected patterns of power 
consumption (Trojan added) or unexpected sensitivity to process variations (likely alteration).  Some 
ICs now actively resist malicious alterations through built-in redundancy and self-checking [8]. 
Challenge 4. Efforts toward improved physical integrity of electronic systems must include better 
understanding of relevant attacks [22] and corresponding protections (e.g., side-channel attacks are 
well-studied now, but fault-injection and chip-replacement attacks are not). RFIDs, smartcards, e-
passports and mission-critical industrial systems drive related efforts. The portable nature and small 
form factors of these devices hamper the integration of costly and processing-intensive security 
mechanisms [13].  
Challenge 5. The impact of corrupted chips on software needs to be studied in great detail, with 
the goal of devising effective countermeasures [21]. Such countermeasures may be preventive, 
detective and/or reactive, including fallback scenarios and safe modes. Both software-based and IC-
based techniques in this category are of great interest. 
 
IV.   RECENT INDUSTRY AND STANDARDS-SETTING EFFORTS 
 
A number of companies, large and small, as well as government institutions hold stakes in 
various hardware aspects of cybersecurity. In the semiconductor industry, such companies are 
represented by the participants of the DARPA TRUST program [1] that focuses on the implantation of 
Trojan horses (by “red teams”) and their detection (by “blue teams”). In the U.S., NIST is the primary 
standards-setting body for solutions in secure hardware, software and communications protocols. In 
addition to well-known milestones, such as AES, NIST is developing new standards for cryptographic 
hash functions (earlier functions are no longer considered cryptographically secure). 
A major initiative in the PC industry, known as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), primarily focuses 
on software security (viruses, Trojans) [19]. Supported by Microsoft Windows and Linux, TPM is 
implemented as a separate chip with secure memory for software keys. TPM checks the integrity of 
the hardware configuration and halts the operating system if significant changes are detected. 
However, TPM does not track subtle changes in ICs such as design Trojans.  
In the automotive industry, several European and U.S. projects are working toward new 
standards for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication, including 
security solutions. A small embedded security company, escrypt, is responsible for the design, 
implementation, and testing of security hardware and 
software components in some of these projects (see 
http://www.escrypt.com for more details). Its security 
platform esBOX V2X for secure vehicle communication is 
currently undergoing field-operational tests. The esBOX 
implements the DSRC IEEE 1609.2 draft security standard 
and offers fast signature generation and verification 
(400sig/s), broadcast of certificates, as well as encryption DAC.COM KNOWLEDGE CENTER ARTICLE 
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and decryption services. Additionally, esBOX supports IEEE 1609.11 compliant applications, such as 
secure tolling and electronic payment schemes. It is compatible with Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 
cellular and satellite communications. The hardware includes an Open Multimedia Application 
Platform board (TI OMAP with a 720 MHz ARM Cortex A8) connected to an FPGA (Xilinx Virtex-4 
FX12) that accelerates cryptographic primitives and offers further reconfigurability. esBOX protects 
itself using countermeasures against spoofed, relayed and replayed messages. 
 
V. THE ROLE OF EDA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Improving hardware security requires modifications to how chips are designed and optimized, 
verified and tested. However, these changes must be compatible with existing practice, prevailing IC 
design infrastructure, embedded software, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, while 
requiring only minimal additional design resources, especially the time of IC engineers. Most of the 
additional work must be delegated to EDA tools by enriching existing EDA tool-chains with hardware-
security features. Therefore, progress in hardware security is unthinkable without concerted efforts of 
the EDA industry and the research community. A number of research and business opportunities exist 
in hardware security for EDA researchers and EDA vendors. Some of them directly address 
challenges articulated above, and some offer necessary design-flow infrastructure. 
Dealing with third-party IP. Since interfacing to external and third-party IP is a source of 
vulnerability, new methods and tools for verifying interfaces and checking the integrity of the third-
party IPs are needed. Another potential research direction is compartmentalization and firewalling of 
design blocks, such that a malicious core cannot jeopardize valuable design resources.    
Infrastructure for unique chip IDs. A common theme in recent literature on hardware security is 
the application of PUFs to chip fingerprinting, hardware-based authentication, and key generation for 
public-key cryptography [3][14][16][20]. Such applications of PUFs motivate new physical-design 
techniques for stabilization of PUF responses in the presence of environmental fluctuations and 
process variations [20]. To integrate this research into EDA flows, new CAD tools and techniques will 
have to be introduced to automatically embed the unclonable keys in IC designs and layouts and 
ensure resiliency against removal attacks. 
Verification techniques, such as unbounded model-checking, may be instrumental in IP 
inspection, e.g., to detect hidden features that are triggered by statistically unlikely input combinations. 
To achieve scalability, functional simulation may first identify circuit modules that remain dormant 
under normal execution, while more time-consuming formal methods can focus on such modules. 
Deeper analysis may detect sequentially deep states that can only be reached under certain 
conditions and may be used by design Trojans to evade detection by traditional techniques for design 
verification and circuit test. 
IC Inspection and Testing. A potential avenue to explore for Trojan detection is accelerated 
inspection of ICs that would guard against malicious alterations by matching masks or chips against 
correct templates of a golden functionality. Such inspection tools must be cheaper than those 
currently offered by semiconductor equipment vendors, and must also be easily accessible so as to 
be employed throughout the supply chain by third parties, but without facilitating extensive reverse-
engineering. Formulating a proper (golden) error-free model is a challenge on its own. Further, the 
verification/test protocol should be mindful of disclosing intellectual property. To this end, it is possible 
that zero-knowledge proofs developed by theoretical computer scientists may find new uses in this 
application. On the other hand, modern and upcoming optical and X-ray metrology tools have not 
been used to their full potential because adequate methods for automated characterization and test 
are poorly understood. The development of new methods and tools for hardware security will also be DAC.COM KNOWLEDGE CENTER ARTICLE 
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driven by the emergence of nano-scale devices and atomic-scale effects, with subsequent changes to 
manufacturing processes and chip testing. 
Physical design support. Past work in this domain includes comprehensive techniques for 
watermarking IC layouts [7], classified today as passive hardware metering. However, mask-level 
watermarking still appears an interesting research problem. Passive hardware metering suffers known 
limitations as it helps confirm rather than discover malfeasance. While active metering techniques are 
available today, they do not address several types of known attacks. To this end, there is demand for 
layout techniques to resist incremental layout modifications that affect functionality or insert side-
channels. Such specialized techniques may need to the counter common objective of increasing 
flexibility to enable late design changes, or can be applied as post-processing to final designs.  
Conceptual challenges in IC security deal with (1) data representations that can faithfully 
capture design functionality at each level of abstraction, as well as chip layout, (2) algorithms to 
compare both functionalities and layouts, with particular efficiency for nearly identical comparands, (3) 
methodologies for challenge-response tests that combine coverage guarantees of existing EDA tools 
with cryptography protocols to ensure resistance to attacks, and (4) effective optimization to decrease 
the overhead of hardware security. It is particularly interesting to explore the amount of flexibility 
present in highly optimized designs, and potential means to enable or disable such flexibility. 
In summary, we feel that by addressing key needs in IC hardware security, the EDA community 
can add significant value to existing methods and tools. While we have touched upon several open 
problems, many more interesting and useful challenges can be identified and pursued, leading to 
chips that can protect themselves from various attacks.  
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
  Several key emerging challenges in electronic design can be addressed with a new breed of integrated 
circuits that cannot be freely cloned or replaced, and resist malicious alterations. New methods for 
protection of integrated circuits and their contents/communications are being developed and integrated 
within the traditional design automation flow. Such methods will motivate new EDA products and revisions 
of existing products, while offering significant value to their users. Several improvements are required and 
many challenges remain to be addressed by researchers. Contemporary topics in this field include the 
development of new techniques for IC and IP protection and necessary infrastructure, such as stable and 
unclonable methods for IC identification and unclonable attack-resilient security key storage, verifying the 
integrity of third party IP, testing for malicious alterations, and identifying and detecting hardware 
backdoors (Trojans). Security of multichip systems and the impact of subverted chips on software are very 
promising topics, as is ensuring the security and protection of lightweight embedded systems. EDA is 
uniquely positioned to play a key role in providing security and protection for future generations of 
hardware designs and their applications. A great deal of relevant technical information is available in the 
publications listed in our references. Recommended reading includes coverage of the following topics: IC 
metering and piracy protection [2][15], IP watermarking [7][12], Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) 
[16][10], and Trojan insertion/detection [1][17]. Recent technical publications discuss the design of 
malicious hardware and the addition of hard-to-detect nefarious features [9][15][19], new attacks on key 
components of hardware infrastructure for cryptography [22], and the design of secure systems from 
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